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Abstract
Are prices less sticky when markets are more competitive? Our
intuition would naturally lead us to give an aﬃrmative answer to that
question. But we first show that DSGE models with staggered price
or wage contracts have actually the opposite and paradoxical prop-
erty, namely that price stickiness is an increasing function of compet-
itiveness. To eliminate this paradox, we next study a model where
monopolistic competitors choose prices optimally subject to a cost of
changing prices as in Rotemberg (1982a,b). For a given cost function,
we find the more intuitive result that more competitiveness leads to
more flexible prices.
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1 Introduction
Is there a connection between competitiveness, market power and the “stick-
iness” of prices1? This is an old question and, as early as 1935, Gardiner
Means noted that, in the face of the general slump, prices were falling less in
sectors with high market power.
Recently price or wage rigidities have been successfully introduced into
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models2. The corresponding
models succeed in reproducing the persistent response of output and inflation
found in the data. Modelling nominal rigidities has notably taken the form
of staggered wage or price contracts à la Taylor (1979, 1980) or Calvo (1983).
It is possible to answer in such a framework our question on competi-
tiveness, since these models include a parameter which explicitly depicts the
degree of competitiveness, more specifically the elasticity of substitution be-
tween goods. But the answer to our question is highly paradoxical since, as
we shall see below, in models with staggered price contracts, one finds that
more competitiveness leads to more sticky prices.
The intuition is easy to grasp if one goes to the extreme case of perfectly
substitutable goods, corresponding to a competitive market. Consider to
simplify a Taylor model with two periods contracts. In any period t half
of the agents renew their contract. Because of perfect substitutability these
agents will have to align their price on the lowest price set in t−1 (which still
holds, since the contracts last 2 periods). And for the same reason so will
agents in period t+1. By that time all prices will be the same and, continuing
the same reasoning, all future prices will be equal to that price also, so that
prices are totally sticky irrespective of the shocks to which the economy may
be subjected. So full competitiveness leads to complete stickiness of prices
in that model.
Clearly this result is quite counterintuitive and our intuition would rather
lead us to believe that more competitive markets should lead to more flexible,
less sticky, prices.
So in a second step we want to construct a model where more competi-
tiveness leads to more flexible prices. For that we shall use a diﬀerent model
1By more sticky prices we will mean prices that return more slowly to their market
clearing value. In what follows prices will have an autoregressive root, denoted below as
φ, and stickiness will be measured by the size of that root.
2See for example Ascari (2000), Ascari and Rankin (2002), Bénassy (2002, 2003a,b),
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001), Collard
and Ertz (2000), Hairault and Portier (1993), Huang and Liu (2002), Jeanne (1998), Kim
(2000), Smets and Wouters (2003), Woodford (2003), Yun (1996), and several others.
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of price stickiness proposed by Rotemberg (1982a,b), where prices are sticky
because there is a cost of changing prices, measured by an explicit convex
cost function. We shall show that, for a given cost function, the “flexibility”
of prices increases with competitiveness.
2 The model
2.1 The agents
Households have an intertemporal utility function:
U =
X
βt
·
LogCt + σLog
µ
Mt
Pt
¶
− ξL
ν
t
ν
¸
ν > 1 (1)
and are submitted in each period to a budget constraint:
PtCt +Mt =WtLt +Πt + µtMt−1 (2)
where µt is a multiplicative money shock à la Lucas (1972) and Πt is dis-
tributed profits.
Output is produced with intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] by com-
petitive firms. They all have the same constant returns to scale production
function:
Yt =
µZ 1
0
Y θjtdj
¶1/θ
0 < θ ≤ 1 (3)
where Yt is the level of output and Yjt the amount of intermediate good j used
in production. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is
equal to 1/ (1− θ), so the parameter θ is a good index of competitiveness.
These output firms competitively maximize profits:
Pt
µZ 1
0
Y θjtdj
¶1/θ
−
Z 1
0
PjtYjt (4)
Intermediate goods themselves are produced by monopolistically compet-
itive firms indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Firm j has a production function:
Yjt = ZtL
α
jt 0 < α ≤ 1 (5)
where Zt is a common productivity shock.
3
2.2 Price rigidities
We shall consider in this article two alternative models of price rigidities:
- In the first model we shall consider, prices are set according to Calvo
(1983) contracts. The probability of a price contract to continue unchanged
is γ. Conversely every contract can break with probability 1 − γ. If a con-
tract breaks in firm j at time t, this firm sets a new price Xjt, based on all
information available up to time t.
- In the second model we shall consider, as in Rotemberg (1982a,b), a firm
producing intermediate product j incurs, in addition to production costs, a
cost of changing prices, denoted as χjt in real terms, where:
χjt =
λ
2
Yt
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶2
(6)
3 Common equilibrium conditions
We shall thus study two models, and begin by deriving in this section the
first order and equilibrium conditions that are common to these two models.
3.1 Households
Households maximize the discounted utility (1) subject to the budget con-
straints (2). The Lagrangean is:
X
t
βt
·
LogCt + σLog
µ
Mt
Pt
¶
− ξL
ν
t
ν
+ ζt (WtLt + µtMt−1 − PtCt −Mt)
¸
(7)
and the first order conditions in Ct, Lt and Mt:
ζtPt =
1
Ct
(8)
ζtWt = ξL
ν−1
t (9)
ζt =
σ
Mt
+ βEt
¡
ζt+1µt+1
¢
(10)
Combining (8) and (9) we find:
Wt
PtCt
= ξLν−1t (11)
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Now combining (8) and (10) and using µt+1 =Mt+1/Mt, we obtain:
Mt
PtCt
= σ + βEt
µ
Mt+1
Pt+1Ct+1
¶
(12)
which solves as:
Mt
PtCt
=
σ
1− β (13)
3.2 Output firms
Output producing firms competitively maximize profits (eq. 4) subject to
the production function (eq. 3). This yields the demand for intermediate
good j:
Yjt = Yt
µ
Pjt
Pt
¶−1/(1−θ)
(14)
The elasticity of these demand curves goes from 1 to infinity (in absolute
value) when θ goes from zero to one, so again θ appears as a natural index
of competitiveness.
Since the output firms are competitive, the aggregate price is equal to the
usual CES index:
Pt =
·Z 1
0
P
−θ/(1−θ)
jt
¸−(1−θ)/θ
(15)
4 Price dynamics under Calvo contracts
We shall now show that under Calvo contracts persistence is, quite counter-
intuitively, positively related to competitiveness.
4.1 Optimal price setting
We shall first derive optimal price setting by intermediate firms under Calvo
price contracts. Consider a firm j which has to decide in period t its “new
price” Xjt. If that contract is still in eﬀect in period s ≥ t (with probability
γs−t), the corresponding real profit in period s will be:
Πjs
Ps
=
XjtYjs −WsLjs
Ps
=
XjtYjs
Ps
− Ws
Ps
µ
Yjs
Zs
¶1/α
(16)
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Firm j maximizes expected discounted real profits, multiplied by the
marginal utility of consumption. Since utility (1) is logarithmic in consump-
tion, this marginal utility is equal to 1/Cs = 1/Ys. So firm j maximizes the
expected value of the following criterion, where the term γs−t represents the
probability that the price contract Xjt signed in t is still in eﬀect at time s:
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−t
Πjs
PsYs
=
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−t
"
XjtYjs
PsYs
− Ws
PsYs
µ
Yjs
Zs
¶1/α#
(17)
Now inserting (5) and (14) (with Pjs = Xjt, since we are dealing with the
contract signed in t) into (17), we obtain the maximand:
Et
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−t
"µ
Xjt
Ps
¶−θ/(1−θ)
− Ws
PsYs
µ
Ys
Zs
¶1/αµ
Xjt
Ps
¶−1/α(1−θ)#
(18)
Let us diﬀerentiate with respect to Xjt. We obtain the first-order condi-
tion:
X
(1−αθ)/α(1−θ)
jt Et
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−tP θ/(1−θ)s =
1
αθ
Et
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−t
Ws
PsYs
µ
Ys
Zs
¶1/α
P 1/α(1−θ)s (19)
We see that Xjt is actually independent of j. All firms changing their
price choose the same price, given by (19), which we shall denote as Xt. We
finally use Cs = Ys and replace in (19)Ws by the value given by formula (11)
to obtain the final value of Xt:
X
(1−αθ)/α(1−θ)
t =
ξ
αθ
Et
P
s≥t β
s−tγs−t (Ys/Zs)
ν/α
P
1/α(1−θ)
s
Et
P
s≥t β
s−tγs−tP
θ/(1−θ)
s
(20)
4.2 Price dynamics
Let us start with newly set prices and loglinearize eq. (20). We obtain,
omitting constant terms3:
1− αθ
α (1− θ)xt + (1− βγ)
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−tEt
θ
1− θps
3Lowercase letters represent the logarithms of the corresponding uppercase letters.
6
= (1− βγ)
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−tEt
·
ν
α
(ys − zs) +
1
α (1− θ)ps
¸
(21)
We have from (13) yt = ct = mt − pt, so that (21) is rewritten:
xt = (1− βγ)
X
s≥t
βs−tγs−tEt [(1− δ) (ms − zs) + δps] (22)
with:
δ =
1− αθ − ν + θν
1− αθ = 1−
ν (1− θ)
1− αθ (23)
Note that δ = 1 when θ = 1, i.e. when we are in the competitive case. If
θ < 1, then δ < 1. Diﬀerentiating (23) we find:
∂δ
∂θ
=
ν (1− α)
(1− αθ)2
> 0 (24)
Let us now turn to aggregate prices, which are given by eq. (15) above.
In view of the “demographics” of price contracts, a fraction (1− γ) γi of price
contracts comes from period t− i, i = 0, 1, ....∞, so that (15) is rewritten:
Pt =
"
(1− γ)
∞X
i=0
γiX
−θ/(1−θ)
t−i
#−(1−θ)/θ
(25)
which yields after loglinearization:
pt = (1− γ)
∞X
i=0
γixt−i =
1− γ
1− γLxt (26)
4.3 Resolution
The dynamic system consists of Eqs. (22) and (26) above. Let us forward
(22) one period and take the expectation as of period t:
Etxt+1 = (1− βγ)
X
s≥t+1
βs−t−1γs−t−1Et [(1− δ) (ms − zs) + δps] (27)
Combining with (22) we obtain:
xt = βγEtxt+1 + (1− βγ) [(1− δ) (mt − zt) + δpt] (28)
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Now (26) can be written:
pt − γpt−1 = (1− γ)xt (29)
Forwarding one period and taking the expectation as of t yields:
Etpt+1 − γpt = (1− γ)Etxt+1 (30)
Let us insert into (28) the values of xt and Etxt+1 given by eqs. (29) and
(30). We obtain:
(1− δ) (1− γ) (1− βγ) (pt −mt + zt) + γ (pt − pt−1) + βγ (pt −Etpt+1) = 0
(31)
This equation is of the form:
a (pt −mt + zt) + b (pt − pt−1) + c (pt −Etpt+1) = 0 (32)
with:
a = (1− δ) (1− γ) (1− βγ) b = γ c = βγ (33)
This solves as (see the appendix):
pt = φpt−1 +
∞X
j=0
κjEt (mt+j − zt+j) (34)
where:
κ0 =
a
a+ b+ c (1− φ) κj =
c
a+ b+ c (1− φ)κj−1 (35)
and the autoregressive root φ is solution of the characteristic equation:
Φ (φ) = cφ2 − (a+ b+ c)φ+ b = 0 (36)
4.4 Competitiveness and price stickiness
We shall study how the response of prices to monetary and technology shocks
depends on competitiveness. Let us define the composite shock ωt:
ωt = mt − zt (37)
Now let us first consider as our “benchmark” the case where all prices are
reset every period, i.e. where γ = 0. In that case (31) immediately yields:
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pt = mt − zt = ωt (38)
We shall now consider the case γ 6= 0, and see that the parameter φ in
eq. (34) will appear as a natural measure of the dynamic price stickiness. To
make things particularly clear, let us take the following simple process for
ωt:
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (39)
where the εt are i.i.d. Then it is shown in the appendix that eqs. (34) and
(35) simplify to (eq. 81):
pt = ωt −
φεt
1− φL (40)
We see that, following a shock, the discrepancy between the price and its
benchmark market clearing value ωt is both higher on impact, and returns
more slowly to zero when φ is high. So the parameter φ appears indeed as a
natural parameter to characterize price stickiness.
We can also compute the expression of output. Using yt = mt − pt, eq.
(40) yields:
yt = zt +
φεt
1− φL (41)
We want to see finally how the index of price stickiness φ relates to the
index of competitiveness θ. Combining (33) and (36) we obtain the charac-
teristic equation giving φ:
Φ (φ) = βγφ2 − [(1− δ) (1− γ) (1− βγ) + γ + βγ]φ+ γ = 0 (42)
We can compute:
Φ (0) = γ ≥ 0 Φ (1) = − (1− δ) (1− γ) (1− βγ) ≤ 0 (43)
So there is a root φ between 0 and 1. Let us now find out how this index
of price stickiness φ relates to the index of competitiveness θ. Diﬀerentiate
eq. (42). This yields:
∂φ
∂δ
=
φ (1− γ) (1− βγ)
γ
¡
1− βφ2
¢ > 0 (44)
So finally, combining (24) and (44):
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∂φ
∂θ
=
∂φ
∂δ
∂δ
∂θ
> 0 (45)
We therefore have the paradoxical relation between competitiveness and
price stickiness.
5 Price dynamics under costs of changing prices
We shall now show that if price sluggishness is due to a convex cost of chang-
ing prices as in Rotemberg (1982a,b), then one finds the natural result that
price stickiness is negatively related to competitiveness.
5.1 Optimal price setting
With the cost of changing prices χjt the real profit of intermediate firm j in
period t is:
Πjt
Pt
=
PjtYjt −WtLjt
Pt
− χjt
=
PjtYjt
Pt
− Wt
Pt
µ
Yjt
Zt
¶1/α
− λ
2
Yt
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶2
(46)
Firm j maximizes discounted real profits, multiplied by the marginal
utility of consumption, equal to 1/Ct = 1/Yt, so that firm j maximizes the
expected value of the following criterion:
X
t
βt
Πjt
PtYt
=
X
t
βt
"
PjtYjt
PtYt
− Wt
PtYt
µ
Yjt
Zt
¶1/α
− λ
2
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶2#
(47)
Insert into the discounted profits (eq. 47) the expression of Yjt (eq. 14).
We obtain:
X
t
βt
"µ
Pjt
Pt
¶−θ/(1−θ)
− Wt
PtYt
µ
Yt
Zt
¶1/αµ
Pjt
Pt
¶−1/α(1−θ)
− λ
2
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶2#
(48)
Now insert (11) and Yt = Ct into (48). Keeping only the terms where Pjt
appears, we obtain the maximand:
10
µ
Pjt
Pt
¶−θ/(1−θ)
− ξ
µ
Yt
Zt
¶ν/αµ
Pjt
Pt
¶−1/α(1−θ)
−λ
2
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶2
− βλ
2
Et
µ
Pjt+1
Pjt
− 1
¶2
(49)
Let us diﬀerentiate with respect to Pjt. We obtain the first-order condi-
tion:
− θ
1− θ
µ
Pjt
Pt
¶−1/(1−θ)
+
ξ
α (1− θ)
µ
Yt
Zt
¶ν/αµ
Pjt
Pt
¶−1/α(1−θ)−1
−λ Pt
Pjt−1
µ
Pjt
Pjt−1
− 1
¶
+ βλEt
PtPjt+1
P 2jt
µ
Pjt+1
Pjt
− 1
¶
= 0 (50)
5.2 Price dynamics
All firms j are actually in a symmetric situation, so that in equilibrium
Pjt = Pt. Inserting this into (50) we obtain the dynamic equation for prices:
− θ
1− θ +
ξ
α (1− θ)
µ
Yt
Zt
¶ν/α
−λ Pt
Pt−1
µ
Pt
Pt−1
− 1
¶
+ βλEt
Pt+1
Pt
µ
Pt+1
Pt
− 1
¶
= 0 (51)
We first characterize the long run equilibrium where all prices are equal
over time. Then (51) yields: µ
Yt
Zt
¶ν/α
=
αθ
ξ
(52)
or:
Lt =
µ
αθ
ξ
¶1/ν
= L0 (53)
Now let us go back to the dynamics. Loglinearizing (51) we find:
θ
1− θ
ν
α
(yt − zt)− λ (pt − pt−1) + βλ (Etpt+1 − pt) = 0 (54)
and since, from (13), yt = ct = mt − pt, this becomes:
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νθ (pt −mt + zt) + αλ (1− θ) (pt − pt−1) + αβλ (1− θ) (pt − Etpt+1) = 0
(55)
5.3 Resolution
Again we have an equation of the form:
a (pt −mt + zt) + b (pt − pt−1) + c (pt −Etpt+1) = 0 (56)
with:
a = νθ b = αλ (1− θ) c = αβλ (1− θ) (57)
Eq. (56) is solved in the appendix, and the solution has been already
described above (eqs. 34, 35 and 36).
5.4 Competitiveness and price stickiness
Let us first take as a benchmark the case where the cost of changing prices
is zero, i.e. where λ = 0. In that case (55) immediately yields:
pt = mt − zt = ωt (58)
Let us now consider the case λ 6= 0, and assume again the simple process
for ωt:
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (59)
Then the price is given by (appendix, eq. 81):
pt = ωt −
φεt
1− φL (60)
where φ is solution of the following characteristic equation, obtained by com-
bining (36) and (57):
Φ (φ) = αβλ (1− θ)φ2 − [νθ + αλ (1− θ) (1 + β)]φ+ αλ (1− θ) = 0 (61)
We can compute:
Φ (0) = αλ (1− θ) ≥ 0 Φ (1) = −νθ ≤ 0 (62)
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so that:
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 (63)
We want now to see finally how the index of price stickiness φ relates to
the index of competitiveness θ. Considering first the extreme cases, we note
that φ = 0 if θ = 1 and φ = 1 if θ = 0.
Now let us compute ∂φ/∂θ. Diﬀerentiating (61) we find:
∂φ
∂θ
= − νφ
(1− θ) [νθ + αλ (1− θ) (1 + β − 2βφ)] = −
νφ2
αλ (1− θ)2
¡
1− βφ2
¢
(64)
This is negative since φ ≤ 1, and we therefore have a negative relation
between competitiveness and price stickiness, as our intuition would tell us,
but unlike the model we considered in section 4.
6 Conclusions
We studied in this article simple dynamic models where prices are sticky
either because of staggered price contracts, or because there is a convex
cost of changing them. In these models competitiveness is measured by a
parameter θ which is higher, the higher the substitutability between goods.
Price stickiness is measured by the size of the autoregressive root φ in the
dynamic price process.
We saw that in a model with staggered price contracts (section 4) price
stickiness is, quite counterintuitively, positively related to the parameter θ
representing competitiveness. Although this is clearly disturbing, this should
not deter us from using DSGE models with sticky prices, since we saw that
in an alternative model with convex costs of changing prices (section 5) price
stickiness is, in accordance with intuition, a decreasing function of competi-
tiveness4.
4We may note that convex costs of changing prices have already been used in DSGE
models. See, for example, Hairault and Portier (1993) and Kim (2000).
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Appendix
We want to solve the dynamic equation:
a (pt −mt + zt) + b (pt − pt−1) + c (pt −Etpt+1) = 0 (65)
with:
a > 0 b > 0 c > 0 (66)
Let us define the composite shock:
ωt = mt − zt (67)
We hypothesize a solution of the form:
pt = φpt−1 +
∞X
j=0
κjEtωt+j (68)
From that we deduce:
Etpt+1 = φpt +
∞X
j=0
κjEtωt+1+j
= φpt +
∞X
j=1
κj−1Etωt+j = φ
2pt−1 + φ
∞X
j=0
κjEtωt+j +
∞X
j=1
κj−1Etωt+j (69)
Inserting these into the initial formula (65) we obtain:
(a+ b+ c)
"
φpt−1 +
∞X
j=0
κjEtωt+j
#
− aωt − bpt−1
−c
"
φ2pt−1 + φ
∞X
j=0
κjEtωt+j +
∞X
j=1
κj−1Etωt+j
#
= 0 (70)
Identifying to zero the term in pt−1 we find the characteristic equation
giving φ:
Φ (φ) = cφ2 − (a+ b+ c)φ+ b (71)
We can compute:
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Φ (0) = b > 0 Φ (1) = −a > 0 (72)
so that:
0 < φ < 1 (73)
Now identifying to zero the term in ωt in (70) yields:
κ0 =
a
a+ b+ c (1− φ) (74)
Finally identifying to zero the term in Etωt+j gives:
κj =
c
a+ b+ c (1− φ)κj−1 = ηκj−1 (75)
We want to check that η < 1. This will be the case if:
φ <
a+ b
c
(76)
So we compute:
Φ
µ
a+ b
c
¶
= −a < 0 (77)
so we have indeed η < 1.
We want finally to compute the solution in the particular case where
ωt − ωt−1 = εt (78)
In that case, using (74) and (75), equation (68) yields:
pt = φpt−1 +
κ0
1− ηωt = φpt−1 +
a
a+ b− φcωt (79)
This, in view of (71), becomes:
pt = φpt−1 + (1− φ)ωt (80)
which can also be rewritten:
pt = ωt −
φ
1− φLεt (81)
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